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It is often claimed that supervisors do not differentiate enough between high and low 
performing employees when evaluating performance. The purpose of this paper is to study 
the incentive effects of this behavior empirically. We first show in a simple model that the 
perceived degree of past differentiation affects future incentives. We then study the impact of 
differentiation empirically with a large panel data set spanning many firms in one industry. On 
average, stronger differentiation has a substantial positive effect on performance. This effect 




JEL Classification:  M52, D23 
  





Dirk Sliwka  




E-mail: dirk.sliwka@uni-koeln.de   
 1 Introduction
Most bonus contracts for employees in practice are not based on objective
measures of performance but rather on a subjective performance assessment
by a supervisor. But it has often been stressed (compare e.g. Prendergast and
Topel (1996), Murphy and Cleveland (1995)) that supervisors tend to give
performance ratings that are too compressed relative to the true performance
of their employees. In that case bonus payments presumably will not reward
high performance or sanction low performance adequately. A straightforward
conjecture is that this should lead to lower levels of performance incentives.
In this paper we investigate this conjecture and in particular study the
impact of di⁄erentiation in bonus payments on subsequent performance em-
pirically. The research question we address is to what extent and under which
organizational circumstances di⁄erentiation in bonus payments indeed a⁄ects
future performance.
This question is of substantial practical relevance as many ￿rms still strug-
gle with the question on whether to enforce more di⁄erentiation. As for in-
stance Jack Welch, who has put a large emphasis on establishing a culture
of di⁄erentiation as CEO of General Electric, put it ￿Di⁄erentiation comes
down to sorting out the A, B, and C players. [..]￿(Welch (2003), pp. 195).
He also admits ￿Di⁄erentiation isn￿ t easy￿ (p. 153) and ￿[..] we spent over
a decade building a performance culture with candid feedback at every level￿
(p. 199). And indeed there is an ongoing discussion on whether it is bene￿-
cial or harmful when di⁄erentiation is enforced.1 In a recent survey among
employees from a broad set of ￿rms only 41% of the respondents agree that
supervisors di⁄erentiate enough between low and high performers.2
To study this question we use a large panel data set spanning many
1For discussions on the controversial issues in the popular press see for instance ￿Per-
formance Reviews: Many Neeed Improvement￿in the New York Times, September 10,
2006 or ￿The Struggle to Measure Performance￿in Business Week, January 9, 2006.
2See Towers Watson Global Workforce Study 2010.
2di⁄erent ￿rms in one industry ￿ namely the majority of larger banks in
Germany ￿in which we can track individual bonus payments over time and
have detailed information on speci￿c functions and hierarchical levels. The
key idea of our approach is the following: We investigate to what extent a
higher variation in bonpayments in a certain unit and a given year leads to a
higher performance in this unit in the subsequent year. Of course, unobserved
individual heterogeneity will be an important issue as di⁄erentiation will also
be driven by the speci￿c amount of heterogeneity in abilities in the di⁄erent
units. We thus construct a balanced panel data set and make use of the
within-department variation in the degree of di⁄erentiation to identify its
e⁄ects on subsequent performance.
We illustrate the connection between past degrees of di⁄erentiation and
future performance by ￿rst analyzing a simple model of subjective perfor-
mance evaluations in which employees are uncertain about the precision with
which their performance can be assessed but learn from past bonuses about
the accuracy of the appraisal process. Supervisors who can accurately assess
employee performance di⁄erentiate more in their ratings while those with a
less accurate signal stay closer to prior performance expectations. In turn,
bonus payments which deviate from the mean indicate that a supervisor is
able to di⁄erentiate and this induces higher-powered incentives in the future.
On the other hand, low degrees of di⁄erentiation lead to lower performance
incentives as the employees￿expected marginal return to e⁄ort is reduced.
While this reasoning indicates a positive connection between di⁄erentia-
tion and performance, it is sometimes claimed in the management literature
that di⁄erentiated ratings may destroy employee motivation (compare for
instance the discussion in Pfe⁄er and Sutton (2006), pp. 125). From a be-
havioral economics perspective, fairness considerations may also play a role,
as di⁄erentiation naturally leads to an unequal treatment of employees. If
employees perceive a wage or bonus payment as unfair they may be tempted
to decrease e⁄ort (see e.g. Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Fehr et al. (1993),
3Fehr et al. (1997), Ockenfels et al. (2010)).3 A further potential drawback
of di⁄erentiation is that intra-￿rm competition for wages or bonus payments
may undermine cooperation and lead to sabotage e⁄orts that negatively af-
fect ￿rm performance (Lazear (1989)).4 Hence, the question which of these
e⁄ects will dominate in practice is basically an empirical one. However, there
is surprisingly little empirical evidence across a larger number of ￿rms and
di⁄erent job types on this issue so far.5
Our key results are the following. We ￿nd that di⁄erentiation on average
has a substantial and highly signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on individual perfor-
mance. The e⁄ect is also of economic signi￿cance: When ranking units by
their degree of di⁄erentiation we estimate that moving from the lowest to
the highest quintile of di⁄erentiation future bonuses increase by 31% to 36%.
We also analyze whether the in￿ uence of di⁄erentiation on individual per-
formance di⁄ers between hierarchical levels and functional areas. We ￿nd
very strong positive e⁄ects of di⁄erentiation at the highest and intermediate
levels. But surprisingly, we ￿nd a strongly reduced or even reversed e⁄ect of
di⁄erentiation at the lowest hierarchical levels. Additionally, di⁄erentiation
has the strongest e⁄ect in retail banking, where objective measures of perfor-
mance are widely available and it has a much stronger e⁄ect on performance
for managers as compared to experts.
There are so far many studies in which the relationship between di⁄er-
3However, Abeler et al. (2010) ￿nd in a laboratory experiment that agents who receive
the same wage exert signi￿cantly lower levels of e⁄ort than those who are paid according
to individual performance. A key explanation is that undi⁄erentiated wages can also be
viewed as unfair when some workers have put in higher e⁄orts than others.
4An intriguing novel rationalization for the claim that di⁄erentiation may undermine
motivation has been recently given by Crutzen et al. (2010), who analyze a model in
which a supervisor who is better informed about his subordinates￿talent can increase the
subordinates￿self-image und thus their average e⁄orts by refraining from di⁄erentiation.
5See for instance Rynes et al. (2005) who claim that ￿although there is a voluminous
psychological literature on performance evaluation, surprisingly little of this research ex-
amines the consequences of linking pay to evaluated performance in work settings￿ (p.
572).
4entiation in ￿xed wages and ￿rm performance6 or individual productivity7 is
studied empirically. But these studies report very mixed results. While tour-
nament theory (e.g. Lazear and Rosen (1981)) indeed argues that a higher
di⁄erentiation in agents￿income should increase individual performance in-
centives, the actual di⁄erentiation in ￿xed wages in ￿rms is also driven by
many other considerations such as external market conditions, scarcity of
speci￿c talents, seniority wages, or cohort e⁄ects and may only indirectly
a⁄ect the performance incentives. Only recently researchers have started to
study the connection between di⁄erentiation in bonuses and performance.
Bol (2011), for instance, uses two years of performance data on 200 employ-
ees in a Dutch ￿nancial services company and ￿nds that rating compression is
negatively correlated with subsequent subjective and objective performance
measures. Engellandt and Riphahn (2011) use three years of panel data
from a Swiss unit of an international company and detect a positive e⁄ect of
a higher variability in ratings on future overtime work.
Finally, as rating di⁄erentiation determines the e⁄ective power of incen-
tive schemes, our study also adds to the still rather scarce empirical literature
investigating the e⁄ects of incentive schemes on productivity (for instance
Lazear (2000), Knez and Simester (2001), Bandiera et al. (2007), Hossain
and List (2009)).
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, the illustrative model is
introduced. Section 3 provides an overview on the data set and the empir-
ical strategy is described in detail. Sections 4 and 5 then investigate the
performance e⁄ects of bonus dispersion for the whole data set as well as
for separate subsamples. In section 6, robustness checks and extensions are
presented. Finally, section 7 concludes.
6See e.g. Leonard (1990), Main et al. (1993), Eriksson (1999), Winter-Ebmer and
Zweim￿ller (1999), Heyman (2005), Jirjahn and Kraft (2007), Grund and Westergaard-
Nielsen (2008), or Martins (2008).
7See e.g. Becker and Huselid (1992), Pfe⁄er and Langton (1993), Drago and Garvey
(1998), Bloom (1999), Depken II (2000), and Bloom and Michel (2002).
52 An Illustrative Model
To illustrate how past di⁄erentiation a⁄ects incentives to exert e⁄ort we
consider a simple model building on a framework used for instance by Pren-
dergast and Topel (1996) or Prendergast (2002). Consider the situation of a
risk neutral agent with initially unknown ability a ￿ N (m;￿2
a) who works
for two consecutive periods t = 1;2. In each period he exerts e⁄ort et at cost
c(et) and generates a performance outcome yt = et + a: This performance is
assessed by a supervisor who observes a noisy signal
st = yt + ￿t





. The supervisor now has either a high or a low ability in
evaluating performance accurately, i.e. his type ￿ 2 fL;Hg with ￿2
￿H < ￿2
￿L
and Pr(￿ = H) = ￿. The supervisor knows his type but the agent does not.
In each period the supervisor observes st and then reports a performance
rating rt. The agent receives a wage which is linear in rt such that
wt = ￿ + ￿ ￿ rt:
The supervisor herself has a preference to report the performance as accu-









conditional on the information available in period t. This assumption guaran-
tees that the supervisor reports his best estimate of the agent￿ s performance.
Let ^ mt be the updated expectation of the agent￿ s ability and ^ ￿
2
at its vari-
8If the supervisor is completely sel￿sh, a di⁄erent interpretation is that the principal
can verify the report with a certain probability and then imposes a ￿ne (rt ￿ yt)
2.











This boils down to computing the least squares estimator of yt based on
st conditional on prior distributions which is equal to Et [ytjst]: Hence, the


















































is strictly decreasing in ￿2
￿￿. Hence, a higher variance in the signal observed by
the supervisor leads to a lower variance in reported performance. The reason
is that a rater who can trust less in the accuracy of his own signal puts less
emphasis on this observed signal when assessing the agent￿ s performance. In
turn we have a stronger ￿ distortion￿towards the mean. Rating compression
is therefore stronger when there is a lower accuracy in the appraisal process.
Note that inaccurate signals thus lead to the so-called ￿centrality bias￿in
subjective performance evaluations.
But how does this a⁄ect the exerted e⁄orts? To see that just consider the
agent￿ s optimization problem in period 2. The agent has observed his own
￿rst period appraisal and updated his belief on the accuracy of the appraisal
process. Now denote the subjective probability that the appraisal is of high
quality as ^ ￿2 = Pr(￿ = Hjr1): Using the supervisor￿ s optimal report (1) we
obtain the agent￿ s expected utility
￿ + ￿
￿












































@^ ￿2 > 0 it directly follows that the agent￿ s e⁄ort is upward sloping in the
subjective belief about the quality of the appraisal process.
Finally, we can compute ^ ￿2 =
f(r1;￿=H)
f(r1) : Using that the ￿rst period re-













































































If we now substitute x = r1 ￿ m ￿ e￿
1 it is straightforward to see that this
expression is symmetric in x. Furthermore, it has a unique global minimum
at x = 0 and limx!+1 ^ ￿2 = limx!￿1 ^ ￿2 = 1. The function is thus U-shaped
in the deviation from the mean of potential evaluations (see ￿gure 1). We
therefore obtain:
Proposition 1 A higher variance of ￿rst period ratings leads to a stronger
belief in a performance-contingent appraisal process and in turn to higher
second period e⁄orts.
Hence, agents learn from past degrees of di⁄erentiation on future di⁄er-
entiation and this directly a⁄ects their incentives to exert e⁄ort.






Figure 1: Probability that ￿ = H as a function of r1 ￿ m ￿ e￿
1
3 The Data
We now investigate the connection between past di⁄erentiation and future
performance using a panel data set on compensation in the German banking
and ￿nancial services sector for the years 2005-2007. The data set is owned
by the management consultancy Towers Watson and is used for professional
compensation benchmarking.9 It covers all the largest German banks and
￿nancial services companies and contains detailed individual information on
base salary, bonus payments, age, ￿rm tenure, hierarchical level (6 levels),
functional area, and speci￿c function. Descriptive statistics are provided in
table A2 in the appendix.10
The functional areas represent a broad classi￿cation of the main sectors
in the banking and ￿nancial services industry: Retail banking (RB), asset
management (AM), corporate banking (CB) and private banking (PB), in-
vestment banking (IB), treasury and capital markets (TCM), the typically
lower-skilled service functions (corporate services (CS)) as well as the cross-
divisional functions (corporate production (CP)). Most of the employees in
9Towers Watson (formerly Towers Perrin) data sets have in economics, for instance,
also been used by Abowd and Kaplan (1999), Murphy (1999), and Murphy (2001).
10Due to con￿dentiality reasons, company names had to be anonymized.
9the data set are working in retail banking and in the service and corporate
functions, followed by corporate banking. But we make also use of a much
more detailed classi￿cation of industry-speci￿c jobs, as these functional ar-
eas are subdivided into about 60 speci￿c functions.11 The distribution of
employee-year observations by hierarchical level is shown in table 1.
Level Balanced panel 2005/07
Frequency Percent





1 (lowest) 2,029 4.65
Total 43,594 100.00
Table 1: Distribution by hierarchical level
A very useful feature of this data set is the systematic comparability of
employee positions across di⁄erent ￿rms. As the consultancy o⁄ers com-
pensation benchmarking services, it applies a standardized job evaluation
method to determine the speci￿c function and hierarchical level of a job.
Therefore so-called career levels are de￿ned that re￿ ect typical steps in an
individual￿ s career. Each career level is described through detailed pro￿les of
the skills, knowledge and behaviors that are required for the position. These
levels are then integrated into four career ladders for managerial positions on
the one hand and functional experts on the other (i.e. professional, sales and
support). In our sample, about 48% of all employee-year observations belong
to the sales ladder, more than 20% to the professional ladder and about 10%
are managerial positions.
The empirical strategy is as follows. We analyze a balanced panel data
set to investigate the e⁄ects of di⁄erentiation within a department on indi-
11A list of exemplary functions is given in table A1 in the appendix.
10vidual performance in the subsequent year. In a ￿rst step, we generate cells
capturing the organizational units of a company. A unit is characterized
by a unique combination of year, company, functional area, detailed func-
tion, career ladder and hierarchical level. We restrict our analysis to cells
with a minimum number of three observations. Then we compute di⁄erent
measures of bonus dispersion within each unit and for each year: the coe¢ -
cient of variation, i.e. the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean, the
P90/P10 ratio, i.e. the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile and the stan-
dard deviation of logs. We include only observations with non-missing and
positive actual bonus payments to capture only positions which are eligible
for a bonus payment.
It is important to understand why we use the bonus as key dependent
variable. The prevalent structure of a bonus plan in a bank is the following:
Typically, a so-called bonus pool is assigned to a unit and the size of the
pool usually depends on the overall company￿ s and the unit￿ s own ￿nancial
performance. This bonus pool is then distributed across the subunits and
￿nally across individual employees in the unit ￿typically based in the end
on a subjective assessment of the employees￿performance. Hence, the bonus
payment is a direct function of a unit￿ s ￿nancial success and the individual
employee￿ s contribution to this success. Higher bonuses can only be achieved
with a higher ￿nancial and individual performance. Indeed, a recent survey
by Towers Watson among the banks in the studied data set shows that 78%
of the respondents use such a bonus pool system and in most of the remain-
ing companies individual bonuses depend on the ￿nancial performance of the
bank and the relevant subunit in some other form. We will show in section
6 that within-bank variations of ￿nancial success over time indeed strongly
predict variations in the actual bonus payments. Hence, bonuses are a very
useful measure of an individual employees￿pro￿t contribution. Moreover,
bonus payments can be compared across and within departments in the dif-
ferent banks considered. It is virtually impossible to ￿nd another measure
11of individual performance that is comparable across such broad categories of
employees.
We follow a conservative approach by restricting all samples to employees
staying at the same hierarchical level, speci￿c function and career ladder
throughout all the years. Hence, we drop a large number of employees to
obtain a balanced panel data set. This is important to exclude variability
in bonus payments due to employee movements like promotions, functional
rotation, entry, exit or changes in team composition.12 In the 2005-2007
panel, about 12,000 individuals can be observed over a three-year period
with 1,455 unique cell-year combinations and an average (median) size of 31
(7) observations per cell.
We then run regressions with employee ￿xed e⁄ects where the log of the
individual bonus payment of a person i in a year t is the dependent variable.
Our key independent variable is the measure of dispersion (coe¢ cient of
variation, P90/P10 ratio, and standard deviation of logs) of bonus payments
in year t ￿ 1 in the relevant cell. Additional control variables include the
log of base salary, age, ￿rm tenure, functional area, function, career ladder,
company and year. In the baseline regressions, we use two speci￿cations to
analyze the e⁄ects of di⁄erentiation: In the ￿rst speci￿cation, the dispersion
measures are included as independent variables in the regression models.
To allow for nonlinear e⁄ects of di⁄erentiation and to quantify economic
signi￿cance, these measures are further categorized into quintiles and we
include dummy variables for each quintile.
12All key results remain stable when we use the larger unbalanced data set.
124 Performance E⁄ects of Di⁄erentiation
4.1 How much Di⁄erentiation?
There is substantial variation in the degree of di⁄erentiation between the
organizational units. Descriptive statistics of the dispersion measures for the
balanced panel are shown in table 2.
Level Balanced panel 2005/07
Mean Median SD Min Max
CV 0.33 0.27 0.20 0 2.06
P90/P10 2.59 1.93 2.76 1 77.28
SD of logs 0.33 0.29 0.18 0 1.90
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for measures of dispersion
The lowest coe¢ cient of variation, for example, is 0 and the highest 2.06,
with a mean value of 0.33 (median 0.27). Regarding the P90/P10 ratio, we
obtain values between 1 and 77.28 with a mean ratio of 2.59 and a median
of 1.93. The deciles of the coe¢ cient of variation are displayed in ￿gure 2.13
Table A3 in the appendix reports median values of the coe¢ cient of vari-
ation and the P90/P10 ratio in bonus payments for the years 2005 to 2007
by hierarchical level. There is a slight tendency that the degree of variation
increases with the hierarchical level. It is interesting to note that there are
also di⁄erences in the degree of variation between the broader functional ar-
eas as reported in table A4 in the appendix.14 The highest rates of variation
in bonus payments can be found in the capital market-based functions trea-
sury and capital markets, investment banking and asset management. These
areas are also characterized by very high absolute bonus payments. In retail
banking, however, we observe the lowest levels of di⁄erentiation.
13Figure 3 in the appendix shows the deciles of the P90/P10 ratio.
14Due to a small number of observations, the functional areas investment banking, asset
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Figure 2: Deciles of coe¢ cient of variation for bonus payments
But we also ￿nd large di⁄erences in the coe¢ cient of variation even within
the more detailed speci￿c functions. The coe¢ cient of variation in Human
Resources, for example, ranges from 0 to 1.40, in Marketing from 0.01 to
0.76, in Sales Assistance from 0.02 to 0.92, in Corporate Finance from 0.65
to 0.86, and in IT Generalist functions from 0.03 to 0.44. Similar di⁄erences
can be found for the other dispersion measures. But it is important to note
that we do not use this between-department di⁄erences for our empirical
analysis but the variation in the degree of di⁄erentiation within departments
over time.
4.2 Di⁄erentiation and Performance
Table 3 reports estimation results of the baseline regressions with individual
￿xed e⁄ects and the logarithm of bonus payments as dependent variable
14using the balanced panel data set for the years 2005-2007. Key independent
variable is the respective measure of dispersion for the relevant cell in the
previous year. To account for potential within-cell correlation in the error
terms we report robust standard errors clustered on cell-level. All models
include the time varying logarithm of base salary, age, ￿rm tenure, and year
as further control variables. Recall that our panel includes only employees
that did not change the employer, hierarchical level, functional area, function
and career ladder throughout the whole period 2005-2007.
The results in table 3 show that there is a highly signi￿cant positive re-
lationship between di⁄erentiation and future performance, i.e. an increase
in the degree of di⁄erentiation in a departments￿bonus payments in one
year is associated with signi￿cantly higher individual bonus payments in the
subsequent year for all three indicators. A one standard deviation increase
in the coe¢ cient of variation (P90/P10 ratio) leads to an increase in bonus
payments of about 10% (7%), all other factors constant. To give some fur-
ther indication about the economic signi￿cance of this e⁄ect, we ranked all
cells by the degree of di⁄erentiation and then created dummy variables for
each quintile in the distribution of the measures of dispersion. The coe¢ -
cient for the 5th quintile now gives an estimate of the percentage change in
performance when a supervisor who is among the 20% of weakest di⁄eren-
tiators moves to the degree of di⁄erentiation applied by the 20% strongest
di⁄erentiators. Note that these e⁄ects are quite sizeable. For the coe¢ cient
of variation the model in table 3 predicts a 31% increase15 in performance
when moving from rather undi⁄erentiated incentives to highly di⁄erentiated
bonus payments. The coe¢ cients for the P90/P10 ratio and the standard
deviation of logs are even slightly higher with a predicted 33% respectively
36% increase in subsequent performance. It is interesting to note that the
e⁄ects are roughly monotonic in all speci￿cations, i.e. the e⁄ects increase
when moving from the lowest quintile to the highest one.
15Note that e0:2693 = 1:31. See e.g. Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) for details.
15Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments
Balanced panel 2005-2007
Coef. of variation P90/P10 ratio Std. dev. of logs
Di⁄erentiationt￿1 0.5026** 0.0238*** 0.6575***
(0.2168) (0.0092) (0.2008)
2nd Quintilet￿1 0.2044*** -0.0542 -0.0548
(0.0691) (0.0413) (0.1443)
3rd Quintilet￿1 0.1547** 0.1935 0.0564
(0.0659) (0.1265) (0.0636)
4th Quintilet￿1 0.2265*** 0.2519** 0.1673**
(0.0750) (0.1198) (0.0743)
5th Quintilet￿1 0.268*** 0.2876*** 0.3080***
(0.0958) (0.1100) (0.0902)
Ln Base salaryt -0.4489 -0.3372 -0.3346 -0.3671 -0.3815 -0.6278**
(0.3062) (0.3333) (0.2883) (0.2906) (0.2879) (0.2553)
Age squaredt 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0170***
(0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.0001) (0.00005) (0.0024)
Observations 25587 25587 25587 25587 25587 25587
R2 within 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08
1 std. dev. increase 10% 7% 12%
Additional year dummies included. Robust standard errors clustered for cells in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Fixed e⁄ects regression results with measures of dispersion for bal-
anced panel 2005-2007
165 Levels, Functional Areas, and Career Lad-
ders
It is important to investigate whether this e⁄ect also holds for di⁄erent sub-
groups of employees as the e⁄ect of di⁄erentiation should depend on the type
of job. In some areas it may be rather simple to give di⁄erentiated perfor-
mance ratings, for instance, as objective measures of individual performance
are widely available (such as ￿nancial performance indicators). But in other
areas it is quite di¢ cult to assess the individual performance of employees.
In addition, di⁄erentiated ratings often directly lead to relative performance
evaluation of employees.16 As has for instance been pointed out by Lazear
(1989), this may even generate incentives to sabotage colleagues and reduce
cooperation and teamwork. Hence, it is conceivable that di⁄erentiation may
even be harmful in certain units.
5.1 Hierarchical Levels
We start by investigating the e⁄ects of the hierarchical level. To do this
we ￿rst included interaction terms between the measures of di⁄erentiation
and each of the six hierarchical levels in the baseline regression model. The
reference category is level 1, the lowest level in the data set.
These regressions yield some surprising results, as shown in table 4. First
of all, the e⁄ects of di⁄erentiation on subsequent bonus payments are increas-
ing in the hierarchical level an employee is located at. From level 4 upwards,
we ￿nd a highly signi￿cant positive relationship between di⁄erentiation and
future performance.
But strikingly the e⁄ects are reversed at the lowest levels: stronger degrees
of di⁄erentiation come along with a lower subsequent performance on level 1
and the e⁄ect is even signi￿cant for the P90/P10 ratio. As tables A5 and A6
16This is necessarily the case when the supervisors are forced to follow a given distrib-
ution of performance grades as employees then compete for the top grades.
17Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments
Balanced panel 2005-2007
Coef. of variation P90/P10 ratio Std. dev. of logs
Di⁄erentiation t￿1 -0.3793 -0.0222** -0.1083
(0.3234) (0.0108) (0.3185)
Di⁄erentiationt￿1 ￿ Level 2a -0.5199 -0.0349 0.7703
(0.4123) (0.0565) (1.0120)
Di⁄erentiationt￿1 ￿ Level 3 0.2569 0.0296* 0.1734
(0.4757) (0.0166) (0.3654)
Di⁄erentiationt￿1 ￿ Level 4 1.1724*** 0.0427*** 0.9313**
(0.3952) (0.0152) (0.4498)
Di⁄erentiationt￿1 ￿ Level 5 1.2041*** 0.0804*** 1.0419**
(0.3665) (0.0181) (0.5290)
Di⁄erentiationt￿1 ￿ Level 6 2.2380*** 0.1213*** 1.6416***
(0.7129) (0.0242) (0.5757)
Ln Base salaryt -0.1678 -0.2895 -0.3403*
(0.2663) (0.2777) (0.2014)
Observations 25587 25587 25587
R2 within 0.15 0.10 0.11
Age squared and year dummies included. a Reference category: Level 1.
Robust standard errors clustered for cells in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Interactions between measures of dispersion and hierarchical levels
18in the appendix, which report separate regressions for subsamples containing
only two adjacent hierarchical levels, show, this is particularly driven by a
drop in performance for very high degrees of di⁄erentiation at the lowest
hierarchical levels.
There are several potential explanations for this e⁄ect. First of all, at
higher hierarchical levels supervisors can more often rely on ￿nancial indi-
cators to assess the performance of employees while at lower levels ￿nancial
performance is typically measured at the team level. Moreover, ￿rms spend
much more resources on collecting performance information about higher
level managers than for lower level employees.17 For instance, when evaluat-
ing the performance of higher level managers many ￿rms collect information
from di⁄erent sources, for instance in so-called 360￿ feedback systems, where
subordinates and colleagues give input about their peception of a manager￿ s
performance, or in management panels where several higher level managers
jointly assess the performance of managers one level below. In the spirit of
the model presented in section 2, the availability of objective measures of
performance and the higher visibility of managers reduces the uncertainty in
evaluating performance and therefore should lead to a higher accuracy and
in turn to a higher variance in ratings.18 In the model lower values of ￿2
￿￿ at
the same time reduce the share of unwanted noise in the overall variance in
ratings as given by (2) and increase equilibrium e⁄orts (3). Hence, a lower
uncertainty indeed should lead to a closer connection between variance in
ratings and exerted e⁄orts.
On the other hand, on lower levels ￿rms typically rely on the subjective
judgement of a single supervisor and as is well known from the empirical
literature in personnel psychology, these subjective performance assessments
are often a⁄ected by personal preferences of supervisors19. When this is
17A simple extension of the model rationalizes this behavior: For agents whose e⁄orts are
more valuable for the ￿rm an investment in reducing assessment noise is more bene￿cial,
and in turn ￿rms should invest more to bring down ￿2
￿￿.
18Indeed, ratings are more di⁄erentiated at higher levels as table A3 shows.
19See e.g. Murphy and Cleveland (1995) for an overview. Kane et al. (1995) for in-
19the case more di⁄erentiation can be harmful as it may come along with
an unequal treatment of workers which is not due to di⁄erent productivity
levels. Furthermore, it is conceivable that social comparisons may play a
bigger role at lower levels, in particular, when ratings are mostly subjective.
Indeed there is now some evidence that unwanted social comparisons may be
detrimental for employee satisfaction and performance (see e.g. Card et al.
(2010), Ockenfels et al. (2010)).
Finally, employees within a certain unit typically work closely together at
lower levels in the hierarchy. Strong di⁄erentiation may then cause within-
team competition and therefore can have detrimental e⁄ects when coopera-
tion is very important. But managers at higher levels lead separate teams of
lower-level employees and such detrimental e⁄ects of di⁄erentiation should
be less severe. Berger et al. (2010), for instance, investigate the performance
impact of exogenously forced di⁄erentiation in bonus payments in a lab ex-
periment and ￿nd that while enforcing di⁄erentiation is bene￿cial when there
is no interaction among the members of a work group, it is highly detrimental
when workers have an opportunity to harm each other.
5.2 Functional Areas
Given the sizeable di⁄erences in the e⁄ects at the various hierarchical levels
we should also expect di⁄erences between the functional areas. Recall that
most of the employees in our data set are working in retail banking. This area
is characterized by a high level of standardized sales and back o¢ ce activi-
ties. Hence, objective measures of individual performance are more readily
available making di⁄erentiated ratings easier. Furthermore, the structure of
the units we consider in retail banking is di⁄erent as we observe cells in this
stance show that there are substantial di⁄erences between the ratings given by di⁄erent
supervisors to the same employees. For a discussion from an economic perspective see for
instance Prendergast and Topel (1996) or Prendergast (2002).
20area comprising a large number of employees.20
To test whether the aggregate results are driven by certain characteristics
of the retail banking area, we reran the baseline regressions for a subsample
where retail banking is excluded. As table 5 shows the results even get
stronger.
Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments
Balanced panel 2005-2007 (retail banking excluded)
Coef. of variation P90/P10 ratio Std. dev. of logs
Di⁄erentiationt￿1 0.3837** 0.0191** 0.5851***
(0.1891) (0.0075) (0.1661)
2nd Quintilet￿1 0.1841** 0.0916 -0.0911
(0.0924) (0.1134) (0.1374)
3rd Quintilet￿1 0.2338*** 0.2868** 0.1700*
(0.0838) (0.1168) (0.0904)
4th Quintilet￿1 0.2190*** 0.2997** 0.2581***
(0.0788) (0.1219) (0.0938)
5th Quintilet￿1 0.2736*** 0.4214*** 0.3684***
(0.0809) (0.1007) (0.1007)
Ln Base salaryt -0.4957 -0.3641 -0.4106 -0.5732* -0.3629 -0.6797**
(0.4074) (0.3953) (0.3891) (0.3051) (0.3948) (0.2717)
Age squaredt 0.0012 0.0017 0.0014 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011)
Observations 11343 11343 11343 11343 11343 11343
R2 within 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.14
1 std. dev. increase 10% 8% 14%
Additional year dummies included. Robust standard errors clustered for cells in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Fixed e⁄ects regression results with measures of dispersion (retail
banking excluded)
In a second step we estimate the performance e⁄ects of di⁄erentiation for
subsamples comprising di⁄erent functional areas. Besides retail banking, we
20The average cell size is 230 observations compared to 15 observations for all other
areas excluding retail banking.
21consider the following broader areas: Corporate and private banking cover
banking services for corporations and wealthy private clients. Corporate ser-
vices comprise lower-skilled customer support and administration jobs like
secretaries, call center agents, facility managers, and reception desks. Cor-
porate production contains typical (cross-divisional) support functions such
as human resources, ￿nance, accounting, marketing, legal, and economics.
Furthermore we look at the subsample comprising the capital market-based
functions investment banking, asset management and treasury and capital
markets which cover jobs e.g. in money markets, corporate ￿nance, and
fund management. Given our previous considerations we expect that di⁄er-
entiation is bene￿cial in most areas but may be less e⁄ective or even harmful
in corporate services where there are many lower-level jobs and corporate
production where individual performance is typically hard to assess objec-
tively and bonus payments have to rely on subjective and therefore typically
less accurate evaluations.
As table 6 shows there are indeed substantial di⁄erences among the func-
tional areas. Di⁄erentiation has the strongest e⁄ect in private and corporate
banking and retail banking, with a one standard deviation increase in dif-
ferentiation levels leading to about 20% higher bonus payments. This may
not be surprising as these are areas with direct sales activities and objective
measures of performance are more readily available making it easier to assign
di⁄erentiated ratings.21
It is further quite interesting that the e⁄ects are positive and sizeable in
corporate production where we had expected weaker e⁄ects. We also ￿nd a
positive and signi￿cant relationship between di⁄erentiation and performance
in investment banking, asset management and treasury and capital markets.
Note that, in line with the above reasoning, we observe a negative coe¢ cient
for corporate services.
21It is notable that average di⁄erentiation levels are rather low in retail banking (see
Table A4). But this is mostly due to the fact that retail banking comprises a rather high
share of lower-level jobs in which di⁄erentiation is weaker.
22Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments (Balanced panel 2005-2007)
CP CS IB/AM/TCM PB/CB RB
CV Bonust￿1 0.5987*** -0.7285** 0.5118* 0.6553*** 1.8398***
(0.2183) (0.3552) (0.2691) (0.1753) (0.6565)
Ln Base salaryt -0.5228* -0.2588 -0.3534 -0.2499 -0.3251
(0.2872) (0.6725) (0.2116) (0.2730) (0.4219)
Age squaredt 0.0025 0.0015 -0.0034* -0.0024 0.0001**
(0.0024) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0031) (0.00004)
Observations 4041 5131 1002 1169 14244
R2 within 0.21 0.10 0.21 0.28 0.17
1 std. dev. increase 17% -14% 14% 21% 19%
Additional year dummies included. Robust standard errors clustered for cells in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Fixed e⁄ects regression results for subgroups of functional areas
(coe¢ cient of variation)
Further analyses show that the e⁄ect of di⁄erentiation also varies between
hierarchical levels within the functional areas. While di⁄erentiation in the
retail banking area is harmful at the lowest levels in the hierarchy, it has
again a strong positive e⁄ect at intermediate levels.
5.3 Managers or Professionals
The argument that di⁄erentiation is more bene￿cial for jobs in which employ-
ees have stronger independent responsibilities can also be tested di⁄erently by
making use of an additional feature of the data set: The jobs considered are
separated into four di⁄erent career ladders: one management ladder (lead-
ership positions) and three expert/professional ladders (sales, support and
professional). Each ladder spans di⁄erent hierarchical levels. Note that there
are experts also at higher hierarchical levels. These are typically employees
with a high functional expertise but without general managerial responsibili-
ties. Given the above explanation we expect that di⁄erentiation should have
the strongest e⁄ect on performance in the managerial ladder as managerial
23jobs have stronger independent responsibilities and performance can be as-
sessed more directly. To analyze these e⁄ects we include interaction terms
between the di⁄erent measures of dispersion and the career ladders into the
baseline regression model.
This is indeed con￿rmed by the results reported in table 7, where the
professional ladder has been chosen as reference group. Column 1 reports
regressions results for all hierarchical levels in the data set. But as some
of the career ladders do not span all levels, we also report results for the
intermediate levels 3 and 4, where jobs exist in all four career ladders.
Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments
Balanced panel 2005-2007
All levels Level 3 Level 4
CV Bonust￿1 0.5339*** 0.4922* 0.4003***
(0.1002) (0.2580) (0.0773)
CV Bonust￿1 ￿ Managementa 1.9993*** 1.9007* 2.0968***
(0.2352) (1.0026) (0.1991)
CV Bonust￿1 ￿ Sales -0.5917 -1.5855 1.9634***
(0.5915) (1.1328) (0.5796)
CV Bonust￿1 ￿ Support -1.2789*** -0.9902*** -0.1177
(0.2761) (0.3522) (0.4312)
Observations 25587 6793 6362
R2 within 0.21 0.16 0.36
Age squared, base salary and year dummies included. a Reference cat.: career ladder professional.
Robust stand. errors clustered for cells in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Interactions with career ladders (coe¢ cient of variation)
Di⁄erentiation has, on average, a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect for em-
ployees in the professional ladder. But the e⁄ect is much stronger for man-
agerial employees, as the interaction term is very large. This result is robust
in all speci￿cations. The negative e⁄ect for employees in support functions
is in line with the previous results on the di⁄erent functions.
To study the e⁄ects of di⁄erentiation on performance within the main
career ladders, we replicate the baseline model for a subsample of the two
24largest career ladders, the management and professional ladder. As can be
seen in table A7 in the appendix, this yields some interesting results. In
the management ladder, higher levels of di⁄erentiation come along with in-
creasing positive performance e⁄ects. But for functional expert positions,
the pattern is di⁄erent. First, the coe¢ cients are much smaller than in the
regressions for management employees. And, more interestingly, for profes-
sional employees the interaction terms of the 3rd, 4th and 5th quintile are
very similar indicating that there is something like decreasing returns to dif-
ferentiation, i.e. at some point a further increase in di⁄erentiation does not
lead to a further increase in performance.
6 Further Robustness Checks and Extensions
To check the robustness of our results and to validate the key independent
variable we conducted further analyses which are described in the follow-
ing. In a ￿rst step we replicate the baseline regressions for a substantially
smaller data set where an organizational unit is the unit of observation. As
explained in the above, a unit is identi￿ed by a unique combination of year,
company, functional area, function, career ladder and hierarchical level. The
key independent variable is the average bonus in a unit. We then estimate
regressions with unit ￿xed e⁄ects. As the results reported in table A8 in
the appendix show, the positive performance e⁄ects of higher di⁄erentiation
levels can again be con￿rmed.
Furthermore, we did a simple falsi￿cation exercise by running (unit-)￿xed
e⁄ects regressions with the coe¢ cient of variation as dependent variable and
the lagged logarithm of average bonus payments as independent variable in
the reduced unit data set, controlling for average base salary and year e⁄ects.
The coe¢ cient of the lagged logarithm of bonus payments is insigni￿cant (co-
e¢ cient 0:0306; p-value=0:278, which supports the idea that di⁄erentiation
indeed drives performance.
25Finally, we take a closer look at bonus payments as the key dependent
variable. As laid out in the above, it is impossible to access a comparable
set of ￿nancial performance measures on the level of individual units across
the di⁄erent banks. But the ￿nancial success is publicly observable for whole
banks from balance sheets and pro￿t and loss statements. Hence, we collected
￿nancial performance measures (such as the Return on Equity, the Return
on Assets or the Net Income) for a subset of the considered banks from the
Bankscope data base.
First, we used this data to validate whether the bonus paid out to the
employees is indeed a good proxy for the performance contribution as our
arguments above build on the assumption that higher bonuses are paid out
in areas where there is also a higher performance. For these banks we esti-
mated a ￿xed e⁄ects model with the log average bonus payment per bank as
dependent variable and the log of the di⁄erent ￿nancial performance mea-
sures as well as year dummies as independent variables. As table 8 shows
these elasticities indicate a substantially strong and statistically signi￿cant
relationship between ￿rm performance and subsequent average bonus levels.
Note that we estimate the e⁄ects only from the within-bank variation of per-
formance measures and bonus payments over time. Hence, bonus payments
indeed seem to be a suitable proxy for performance, as they are directly
a⁄ected by changes in corporate ￿nancial indicators. And indeed, this rela-
tionship should be even stronger when the success of individual units could
be considered as the bonus pools in banks typically are directly linked to a
unit￿ s ￿nancial performance.
In a next step we give a ￿rst indication on the association between the
average degree of di⁄erentiation within a bank and the bank￿ s overall ￿nan-
cial performance.22 As the number of observations of di⁄erent banks which
publish ￿nancial information is small (up to 20 banks each year) we compute
the Spearman rank correlation coe¢ cient between a ￿rm￿ s average coe¢ cient
22Descriptive statistics on the variables used are provided in table A9 in the appendix.
26Firm panel FE regression
Dependent variable: Ln bonus payments
ROE ROA Net income
Ln Performancet￿1 0.1590** 0.2480*** 0.1960***
(0.0736) (0.0922) (0.0736)
Observations 109 108 109
R2 within 0.24 0.27 0.27
Additional year dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Pay-for-performance sensitivity
of variation in bonus payments in the years 2004-2007 and the di⁄erence in
returns on equity between 2007 and 2004, i.e. the years before the ￿nancial
crisis. Indeed there is a positive and signi￿cant relationship between ￿rm
performance and previous di⁄erentiation levels (Spearman rank correlation
coe¢ cient 0:4576, p-value= 0:086, n= 15).
In a last step, we also consider data from the recent ￿nancial crisis. A
potential conjecture could be that more di⁄erentiation is associated with
higher bank losses as higher powered incentives may have encouraged exces-
sive risk-taking among employees. We ￿nd a slightly negative, but statisti-
cally insigni￿cant, relationship between average di⁄erentiation levels in the
pre-crisis period, i.e. average values of the coe¢ cient of variation from 2004-
2007, and the di⁄erence in returns on equity between year 2009 and 2007
(Spearman rank correlation coe¢ cient ￿0:1434, p-value= 0:570, n= 18).
But it is important to note that much more detailed data has to be collected
to make a robust statement on the connection between pay di⁄erentiation
and risk-taking behavior.
277 Conclusion
We have analyzed the performance e⁄ects of between-employee di⁄erentiation
in bonus payments. Economic reasoning suggests that di⁄erentiation should
increase performance, as it implies higher powered incentives. And we in-
deed found a highly signi￿cant and economically substantial average e⁄ect of
di⁄erentiation on performance. However, a more di⁄erentiated picture arises
when we look at di⁄erent subsamples in our data set. The positive e⁄ect of
di⁄erentiation is strongest at higher hierarchical levels. But di⁄erentiation
may be harmful at the lowest levels.
Our results also shed some light on the quite controversial debate among
practitioners on methods to increase di⁄erentiation in performance appraisals
such as forced distribution systems. As recent surveys show, many ￿rms are
still adapting the degree of di⁄erentiation among high and low performers on
the same job and most ￿rms aim at increasing it. A study by the consultancy
Mercer, for instance, ￿nds ￿companies widening performance di⁄erentials for
short-term incentive payouts [..]. The highest-performing management level
employees are expected to receive average short-term incentive payouts of 36
percent compared to just 8 percent for the lowest performers.￿ . A similar sur-
vey by Towers Perrin concluded ￿In 2010, a full 48% of companies indicated
they will continue with the same di⁄erentiation strategies they used in 2009
for their 2010 salary review process, while an additional 40% will di⁄erentiate
more than in prior years.￿ 23
Our results indicate that for positions in the middle or at the top of
the corporate hierarchy ￿rms should indeed strive to achieve di⁄erentiated
performance ratings, for instance through the introduction of recommended
or even forced rating distributions as this positively a⁄ects performance. On
the other hand, at lower levels ￿rms should be careful when considering to
enforce di⁄erentiation. For instance, at those levels, team bonus payments
23See Mercer 2008/2009 US Compensation Planning Survey and Towers Perrin 2009
Survey on Compensation Strategies.
28that treat employees equally may be a useful alternative as they support
incentives for cooperation and avoid potentially harmful social comparisons.
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338 Appendix
Functional Areas and Functions
Retail Banking Corporate and Private Banking
Retail Banking Product Development Corporate Banking Product Development
Retail Sales Corporate / Institutional Relationship
Telebanking Sales Client Relationship Management
Financial Advice Portfolio Management
Investment Banking/Asset Management Corporate Production
Treasury and Capital Markets Human Resources
Asset Allocation Legal / Economics
Credit Syndication Risk Management
Money Markets Sales & Marketing
Hedge Funds Finance / Accounting
Asset Management Product Development Project Management
Money Transfers
Fund Management Corporate Services
Structured Finance IT Administration / Support
Corporate Finance IT Architecture
Commodity Trading Customer Service
Fixed Income Asset Management Support
Equity Foreign Operations
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Deciles of P90/P10 Ratio (Bonus)
Figure 3: Deciles of P90/P10 ratio for bonus payments
36Level Median coef. of variation Median P90/P10 ratio
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
6 0.33 0.29 0.27 2.24 2.12 2.40
5 0.36 0.34 0.34 2.29 2.35 2.32
4 0.35 0.30 0.33 2.33 2.17 2.27
3 0.21 0.22 0.23 1.76 1.80 1.85
2 0.23 0.25 0.26 1.77 1.82 1.91
1 0.22 0.25 0.20 1.77 1.93 1.47
Total 0.27 0.27 0.27 1.98 1.90 1.91
Table A3: Di⁄erentiation over year and hierarchical level
Funct. area Median coef. of variation Median P90/P10 ratio
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
CP 0.38 0.40 0.33 2.48 2.57 2.30
CS 0.30 0.32 0.28 2.21 2.07 2.16
IB/ AM/ TCM 0.50 0.52 0.54 3.33 3.34 3.73
PB/ CB 0.33 0.33 0.32 2.24 2.20 2.22
RB 0.23 0.25 0.26 1.77 1.82 1.91
Table A4: Di⁄erentiation over year and functional area
37Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments (Balanced panel 2005-2007)
Level 5+6 Level 3+4 Level 1+2
CV Bonust￿1 0.9236*** 0.6588*** -1.0701***
(0.1327) (0.2006) (0.4003)
2nd Quintilet￿1 0.1903 0.0559 0.1351
(0.1338) (0.1048) (0.1513)
3rd Quintilet￿1 0.1921 0.0636 0.1541
(0.1628) (0.1035) (0.1357)
4th Quintilet￿1 0.2429 0.2227** 0.1757
(0.1748) (0.0924) (0.2864)
5th Quintilet￿1 0.3094 0.3241*** -0.0292
(0.2233) (0.1028) (0.2845)
Observations 3540 3540 13155 13155 8892 8892
R2 within 0.25 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.03
Age squared, base salary and year dummies included. Robust standard errors clustered for cells in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A5: Fixed e⁄ects regression results for hierarchical levels (coe¢ cient
of variation)
38Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments (Balanced panel 2005-2007)
Level 5+6 Level 3+4 Level 1+2
P90/P10 Bonus t￿1 0.0638*** 0.0183** -0.0188
(0.0124) (0.0086) (0.0220)
2nd Quintilet￿1 -0.1904*** -0.1644*** 0.0822*
(0.0534) (0.0418) (0.0454)
3rd Quintilet￿1 0.1929 0.0838 0.3084***
(0.1666) (0.0652) (0.1057)
4th Quintilet￿1 0.2513 0.2861*** -0.1373
(0.1560) (0.0697) (0.1968)
5th Quintilet￿1 0.3139* 0.2574*** 0.0117
(0.1692) (0.0726) (0.1242)
Observations 3540 3540 13155 13155 8892 8892
R2 within 0.27 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.01 0.10
Age squared, base salary and year dummies included. Robust standard errors clustered for cells in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A6: Fixed e⁄ects regression results for hierarchical levels (P90/P10
ratio)
39Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments (Balanced panel 2005-2007)
Coe¢ cient of variation
Management Professional
Di⁄erentiation Bonust￿1 2.4454*** 0.4850***
(0.2070) (0.0876)
2nd Quintilet￿1 0.5934** 0.1377
(0.2412) (0.1216)
3rd Quintilet￿1 0.5343* 0.2704***
(0.2974) (0.1039)
4th Quintilet￿1 0.6636** 0.2515***
(0.3080) (0.0890)
5th Quintilet￿1 1.9115*** 0.2462***
(0.3722) (0.0792)
Observations 2263 2263 5704 5704
R2 within 0.56 0.36 0.19 0.15
Age squared, base salary and year dummies included. Robust standard errors clustered for cells
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A7: Di⁄erentiation within career ladders (coe¢ cient of variation)
40Dependent variable: Log. of average bonus payments












R2 within 0.08 0.09
Additional control variables include average base salary and
year dummies. Weighting variable represents cell size.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table A8: Fixed e⁄ects regressions with collapsed data set (robustness check)
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Di⁄erence ROE 2004-2007 29 11.364 24.899 -3.04 125.07
Di⁄erence ROE 2007-2009 34 -11.981 26.288 -141.36 14.57
Average coe¢ cient of variation 2004-2007 20 1.848 0.696 0.589 3.253
Table A9: Descriptive statistics (￿rm panel)
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